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Abstract
Knightian uncertainty leads naturally to nonlinear expectations.
We introduce a corresponding equilibrium concept with sublinear
prices and establish their existence. In general, such equilibria lead
to Pareto inefficiency and coincide with Arrow–Debreu equilibria only
if the values of net trades are ambiguity–free in the mean. Without
aggregate uncertainty, inefficiencies arise generically. We introduce
a constrained efficiency concept, uncertainty–neutral efficiency and
show that Knight–Walras equilibrium allocations are efficient in this
constrained sense. Arrow–Debreu equilibria turn out to be non–robust
with respect to the introduction of Knightian uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
Knightian (or model) uncertainty describes the situation in which the prob-
ability distribution of relevant outcomes is not known exactly. We consider
markets where Knightian uncertainty is described by a set of probability
distributions. In such a situation, it is natural to work with a nonadditive
notion of expectation derived from the set of probability distributions. We
introduce here a corresponding equilibrium concept, Knight–Walras equilib-
rium, where the forward price of a contingent consumption plan is given by
the maximal expected value of the net consumption value.
In a first step, we establish existence of Knight–Walras equilibrium for
general preferences including the well studied classes of smooth ambiguity
preferences and variational preferences. The proof extends Debreu’s game–
theoretic existence proof in an interesting way. Debreu works with a Wal-
rasian player who maximizes the expected value of aggregate excess demand.
In our proof, we introduce a further Knightian player who chooses the worst
probability distribution. Under Knightian uncertainty, we can thus view the
”invisible hand” as consisting of two auctioneers where one of them chooses
the (state) price and the other one the ”relevant” probability distribution.
In case of pure risk, i.e. when the set of probability distributions consists
of a singleton, the new notion coincides with the classic notion of an Arrow–
Debreu equilibrium under risk. A main objective of our paper is to study
the differences to Arrow–Debreu equilibrium which are created by Knightian
uncertainty in prices.
In a first step, we ask under what conditions Arrow–Debreu and Knight–
Walras equilibria coincide. Generalizing the case of pure risk, we show that
this holds true if and only if the value of net demands are ambiguity–free in
mean; in this case, the expected value of all net demands is the same under
all probability distributions.
We then ask how restrictive this condition is. To this end, we study
the well–known class of economies without aggregate uncertainty and pes-
simistic agents. It is well known that agents obtain (efficient) full insurance
allocations in this case (Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000)). We
show that generically in endowments, these Arrow–Debreu equilibria are not
Knight–Walras equilibria. Intuitively, it will be rarely the case that agent’s
net demand is ambiguity–free in mean when individual endowments are sub-
ject to Knightian uncertainty.
One can thus not expect efficiency under Knightian uncertainty. We
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then study a restricted notion of efficiency which we call Uncertainty–Neutral
Efficiency which is related to the space of ambiguity–free contingent plans.
We show that Knight–Walras equilibrium allocations are uncertainty–neutral
efficient.
We then continue to explore the nature of Knight–Walras equilibria in
economies without aggregate uncertainty. It turns out that Arrow–Debreu
equilibria are not robust with respect to the introduction of Knightian un-
certainty in prices. Even with a small amount of Knightian uncertainty, the
unique Knight–Walras equilibrium has no trade, in sharp contrast to the full
insurance allocation of the Arrow–Debreu equilibrium.
A discussion on the present type of nonlinear forward prices can be found
in Araujo, Chateauneuf, and Faro (2012) and Beißner (2012) where no re-
lated questions of equilibrium are addressed. Sublinear prices in general
equilibrium are studied in Aliprantis, Tourky, and Yannelis (2001). More
recently, Richter and Rubinstein (2015) consider convex equilibria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
concept of Knight–Walras equilibria. Section 3 establishes existence of equi-
libria. Section 4 analyzes the relation to Arrow–Debreu equilibria. Section
5 introduces and discusses the alternative Pareto criterion. Section 6 in-
vestigates the equilibrium correspondence when the amount of Knightian
uncertainty is a variable. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix collects proofs.
2 Knight–Walras Equilibrium
2.1 Expectations and Forward Prices
We consider a static economy under uncertainty with a finite state space Ω.
In risky environments, or for probabilistically sophisticated agents, expecta-
tions are given by probability measures on Ω; under Knightian uncertainty,
one is naturally led to sublinear expectations. Let us fix our notion of ex-
pectation first.
Let X = RΩ be the commodity space of contingent plans for our economy.
We call E : X → R a (Knightian) expectation if it satisfies the following
properties:
1. E preserves constants: Ec = c for all c ∈ R,
2. E is monotone: EX ≤ EY for allX, Y ∈ X, X ≤ Y ,
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3. E is sub-additive: E[X + Y ] ≤ EX + EY for all X, Y ∈ X,
4. E is homogeneous: EλX = λEX for λ > 0 and X ∈ X,
5. E is relevant: E[−X ] < 0 for all X ∈ X+ \ {0}.
It is well known1 that E is uniquely characterized by a convex and compact
set P of probability measures on Ω such that
EX = max
P∈P
EPX (1)
for all X ∈ X; EP denotes the usual linear expectation here. Due to the
relevance of E, the representing set P in (1) has full support in the sense that
for every P ∈ P we have P (ω) > 0 for every ω ∈ Ω.
The sublinear expectation E leads naturally to a concept of (forward)
price for contingent plans: let ψ : Ω → R+ be a positive state–price. The
forward price for a contingent plan X ∈ X is
Ψ(X) = EψX ,
in analogy to the usual forward (or risk–adjusted or equivalent martingale
measure) price under risk. We call Ψ : X→ R a coherent price system.
2.2 The Economy with Sublinear Forward Prices
We now introduce an otherwise classic economy with sublinear forward prices.
Definition 1 An Knightian economy (on Ω) is a triple
E =
(
I,
(
ei, U i
)
i∈I
,E
)
where I ≥ 1 denotes the number of agents, ei ∈ X+ =
{c ∈ X : c(ω) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω} is the endowment of agent i, U i : X+ → R
agent i’s utility function, and E is a Knightian expectation.
As we fix the agents I = {1, . . . , I} throughout the paper, we will some-
times use the shorthand notation EE or EP to emphasize the dependence of
the economy on the Knightian expectation E or its set of priors P.
The following example list some natural utility functions in E which have
been axiomatized in the literature.
1See Lemma 3.5 in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Peng (2004),
Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999), or Fo¨llmer and Schied (2011); alternatively,
in Robust Statistics, see Huber (2011).
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Example 1 1. Multiple prior expected utilities (Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989)) take the form
U i(c) = −E[−ui(c)] = min
P∈P
EPui(c) (2)
for a suitable (continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave)
Bernoulli utility function ui : R+ → R.
Interpreting P as the objectively given information about Knightian un-
certainty, we can also allow for subjective reactions to such Knight-
ian uncertainty in the spirit of Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud
(2008)
U i(c) = min
P∈φi(P)
EPui(c)
for a selection φi(P) ⊂ P. Note that a singleton φi(P) = {P0} leads to
ambiguity–neutral, or subjective expected utility agents. Our model thus
includes heterogeneous expectations among agents as a special case.
2. The smooth model of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) has
U i(c) =
∫
P
φi
(
EPui(c)
)
µ(dP )
for a continuous, monotone, strictly concave ambiguity index φi : R→
R and a second–order prior µ, a measure on P.
3. Dana and Riedel (2013) introduce anchored preferences of the form
U i(c) = min
P∈P
EP [ui(c)− u(ei)]
to study economies with incomplete preferences. These preferences have
recently been axiomatized by Faro (2015). Note that we do not treat
incomplete preferences here.
The following equilibrium concept deviates from an Arrow–Debreu equi-
librium by the sublinearity in the pricing expectation.
Definition 2 We call a pair (ψ, c) of a state–price ψ : Ω → R+ and an
allocation c = (ci)i=1,...,I ∈ X
I
+ a Knight–Walras equilibrium if
1. the allocation c is feasible, i.e.
∑I
i=1(c
i − ei) ≤ 0
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2. for each agent i, ci is optimal in the Knight-Walras budget set
B(ψ, ei) =
{
c ∈ X+ : Eψ(c− e
i) ≤ 0
}
, (3)
i.e. if U i(d) > U i(ci) then d /∈ B(ψ, ei).
We discuss some immediate properties of the new concept.
Example 2 1. When P = {P0} is a singleton, the budget constraint is
linear; in this case, Knight–Walras and Arrow–Debreu equilibria coin-
cide. In particular, equilibrium allocations are efficient.
2. At the other extreme, when P = ∆ consists of all probability measures,
and the state-price ψ is strictly positive, the budget sets consist of all
plans c with c ≤ ei in all states. We are economically in the situa-
tion where all spot markets at time 1 operate separately and there is
no possibility to transfer wealth over states. As a consequence, with
strictly monotone utility functions, no trade is an equilibrium for every
strictly positive state price ψ. Equilibrium allocations are inefficient,
in general, and equilibrium prices are indeterminate.
3 Existence of Knight–Walras Equilibria
We first establish existence of a Knight–Walras equilibrium. If agents
have single–valued demand, one can modify a standard proof, as, e.g. in
Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988), to establish existence.
Under Knightian uncertainty, natural examples arise where demand can
be set–valued. A point in case are agents (traders) who minimize a coherent
risk measure; equivalently, one might think of ambiguity–averse, yet risk
neutral agents.
If we include this general case, one needs to work more. We think that the
proof, beyond the natural interest in generality, provides additional insights
into the working of markets under Knightian uncertainty. We thus provide
the more general, lengthier version.
Assumption 1 Each agent’s endowment ei is strictly positive and each util-
ity function U i : X+ → R
• locally non satiated.
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• is norm continuous and concave on X+.
• is monotone: if x ≥ y then U i(x) ≥ U i(y).
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1, Knight-Walras equilibria (ψ, c) exist.
A standard existence proof of Arrow–Debreu equilibrium uses a game–
theoretic ansatz. One introduces a price player who maximizes the expected
value of aggregate excess demand over state prices. Let us call this type of
player a Walrasian price player. The consumers maximize their utility given
the budget constraint. The equilibrium of the game is an Arrow–Debreu
equilibrium.
Our method to prove existence follows this game–theoretic approach. Due
to Knightian uncertainty, we have to introduce a second, Knightian, price
player. This player maximizes the expected value of aggregate excess demand
over the priors P ∈ P, taking the state price as given. The Walrasian price
player in the Knight–Walras equilibrium acts in the same way as in the
Arrow–Debreu equilibrium.
With nonlinear prices, the question of arbitrage comes up naturally. After
all, the equilibrium concept would not be very plausible if it would allow for
arbitrage opportunities.
Corollary 1 In a Knight–Walras equilibrium, the following no arbitrage
condition holds
Ψ
(∑
i
(
cˆi − ei
))
=
∑
i
Ψ
(
cˆi − ei
)
.
Proof: In step 6 of the proof of Theorem 1, we have shown
∑
i(cˆ
i−ei) ≤ 0,
local non–satiation implies
∑
i(cˆ
i−ei) = 0. The constant preserving property
of E yields
0 = E[ψ0] = E
[
ψ
∑
i
(cˆi − ei)
]
= EP
∗
[
ψ
∑
i
(cˆi − ei)
]
=
∑
i
EP
∗
[
ψ(cˆi − ei)
]
≤
∑
i
E
[
ψ(cˆi − ei)
]
= 0.
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The last equality follows from the fact that each agent exhausts the budget
in equilibrium. ✷
4 (Non–) Equivalence to Arrow–Debreu
Equilibrium
If the expectation E is linear, Knight–Walras equilibria are Arrow–Debreu
equilibria; so agents achieve an efficient allocation, by the first welfare theo-
rem. With incomplete Knightian preferences in the sense of Bewley (2002),
the Arrow–Debreu equilibria of the linear economies E{P} are also equi-
libria under Knightian uncertainty (see Rigotti and Shannon (2005) and
Dana and Riedel (2013), wo da angeben!). It seems thus natural to ask
whether such a result might hold true for our Knightian economies.
We will now explore under what conditions this equivalence remains. In a
first step, we show that Knight–Walras equilibria are Arrow–Debreu equilib-
ria if and only if the net consumption values of all agents are ambiguity–free
in mean, i.e. their expectation does not depend on the specific prior in the
representing set P.
We then show for the particular transparent example of no aggregate un-
certainty and Gilboa–Schmeidler preferences that this property is generically
not satisfied.
Definition 3 Fix a convex, compact, nonempty set of priors P. We call a
plan ξ ∈ X (P)–ambiguity free in mean if ξ has the same expectation for all
Q ∈ P, i.e. there is a constant c ∈ R with EQξ = c for all Q ∈ P.
Note that a plan ξ is ambiguity–free in mean if and only if we have
E(−ξ) = −Eξ .
We will use this fact sometimes below2.
2 The concept has appeared before in (Riedel and Beißner (2014) and
De Castro and Chateauneuf (2011). For unambiguous events, see also Epstein and Zhang
(2001). In the spirit of Brunnermeier, Simsek, and Xiong (2014), elements in the space
L, can be considered as belief neutral in expectation. Section 4 presents a more detailed
account. A stronger notion would require that the probability distribution of a plan is
the same under all priors in P; Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) call such
plans ”crisp acts”.
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Lemma 1 The set of plans ξ ∈ X which are P–ambiguity–free in mean forms
a subspace of X. We denote this subspace by L or LP. If #P > 1, L has a
strictly smaller dimension than X.
Proof of Lemma 1: Let L denote the set of all contingent plans which
are ambiguity–free in mean. Constant plans are obviously ambiguity–free in
mean, hence L is not empty. As expectations are linear, the property of being
ambiguity–free in mean is preserved by taking sums and scalar products.
Hence, L is a subspace of X.
If #P > 1, we have P1, P2 ∈ P such that P1 − P2 6= 0 ∈ X. In abuse of
notation x ∈ X is {P1, P2}–ambiguity–free in the mean, if
〈P1, x〉 = 〈P2, x〉.
This equation yields a hyperplane H = {x : 〈P1 − P2, x〉 = 0}, with 0 ∈ H .
Consequently H is subvector space of X with strictly smaller dimension and
contains all plans being {P1, P2}–ambiguity free in mean.
The result follow from the first part and {P1, P2} ⊂ P implies L ⊂ H .
✷
We can now clarify when Arrow–Debreu equilibria of a particular linear
economy E{P} are also Knight–Walras equilibria.
Theorem 2 Fix a prior P ∈ P. Let (ψ, (ci)) be an Arrow–Debreu equi-
librium for the (linear) economy E{P}. Then (ψ, (ci)) is a Knight–Walras
equilibrium for EP if and only if the value of net demands ξi = ψ(ci− ei) are
ambiguity–free in the mean for all agents i.
Proof: Let (ψ, (ci)) be an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium for the (linear)
economy E{P}. Then markets clear.
Suppose first that the value of net demands ξi = ψ(ci−ei) are ambiguity–
free in the mean for all agents i. We need to check that ci is in agent i’s
budget set for the Knightian economy EP, and optimal. By assumption, we
have
EQψ(ci − ei) = c
for all Q ∈ P for some constant c. As ci is budget–feasible in EP and utility
functions are locally non–satiated by Assumption 1, we have c = 0, i.e.
Eψ(ci − ei) = EPψ(ci − ei) = 0 .
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As ci is part of an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium, ci is optimal in the linear
budget set given by the prior P ; this budget set contains the budget of the
Knightian economy EP. Hence, ci is optimal for agent i in the Knightian
economy. We conclude that (ψ, (ci)) is a Knight–Walras equilibrium for EP.
Now suppose that (ψ, (ci)) is a Knight–Walras equilibrium. We need to
check that all ξi have expectation zero under all Q ∈ P for all i.
As utility functions are locally non satiated, the budget constraint is
binding for all agents, Eξi = 0 for all i. It is enough to show that E( −
ξi) = 0 for all i (because this entails minP∈PE
P ξi = maxP∈PE
P ξi = 0 .) By
sublinearity, we have E(− ξi) ≥ 0. Market clearing implies
E(−ξi) = E
(∑
j 6=i
ξj
)
≤
∑
j 6=i
Eξj = 0 .
We conclude that E(−ξi) = 0 for all i, as desired. ✷
We now turn to the particularly transparent case of no aggregate uncer-
tainty and multiple prior utilities. We shall show that generically in endow-
ments, Arrow–Debreu equilibria are not Knight–Walras equilibria.
So assume for the rest of this section that∑
ei = 1
and utilities are of the form
U i(c) = min
P∈P
EPui(ci)
where the Bernoulli utility functions ui : R+ → R satisfy the standard as-
sumptions of Example 1.
These economies have been studied in detail
in (Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000) and
Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tallon (2000)). We recall the results. if (ψ, (ci))
is an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium of the economy
(
I, (ei, U i)i∈I ,P
)
, (ci) is
a full insurance allocation. Moreover, there exists P˜ ∈ P such that ψ is
proportional to the density dP˜
dP
, and (1, (ci)) is an equilibrium of the economy(
I, (ei, U i)i∈I , {P˜}
)
.
Equilibrium prices are not determinate because the utility gradient at
equilibrium consists of all priors P. The above result states that one can
take the equilibrium state-price density to be equal to 1 after a suitable
change of measure.
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Theorem 3 Assume that E is not linear. Generically in endowments,
Arrow–Debreu equilibria of E{P} for some P ∈ P are not Knight–Walras
equilibria of EP.
More precisely: let M =
{
(ei)i=1,...,I ∈ X
I
++ :
∑
ei = 1
}
be the set of
economies without aggregate uncertainty normalized to 1. Let N be the subset
of elements (ei) of M for which there exists P ∈ P and an Arrow–Debreu
equilibrium (ψ, (ci)) of the economy E{P} which is also a Knight–Walras equi-
librium of the economy EE. N is a Lebesgue null subset of the (I − 1) ·#Ω–
dimensional manifold M .
Proof: Let (ei) be an allocation in N . Let (ψ, (ci)) be an Arrow–Debreu
equilibrium of the economy
(
I, (ei, U i)i∈I , {P}
)
. Then we know that ci > 0
is a constant for each agent i. Hence, each P ∈ P is a minimizing prior of
maxmin expected utilities. In particular and in abuse of notation, we have
∂U i(ci) = ui
′
(ci) · P, for each i ∈ I.
By the first order condition of Pareto optimality of the P -Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium, we have for some equilibrium weight αP ∈ ∆I
ψ · P ∈
⋂
i∈I
αiP∂U
i(ci) =
⋂
i∈I
αiPu
i′(ci)P.
Note, that the intersection is nonempty by the Pareto optimality of (ci).
Since αiu
i′(ci) is constant for i ∈ I and P ∈ P, this implies that ψ is
contant. Let us say ψ = 1 without loss of generality. From Theorem 2, we
then know that ψ(ci − ei) ∈ L. As ψ and ci are constants, and L is a vector
space by Lemma 1, we conclude that ei ∈ L. As the space L has strictly
smaller dimension than X, again by Lemma 1, we conclude that N is a null
set in M . ✷
5 Uncertainty–Neutral Efficiency
In general, Knight–Walras equilibria are inefficient. We introduce now a con-
cept of constrained efficiency for our Knightian framework. If the Walrasian
auctioneer aims for robust rules, he might consider only net trades that are
independent of the specific priors in P.
We might also consider a situation of cooperative negotiation among the
agents. In a framework of Knightian uncertainty described by the set of
priors P, different priors may matter for different agents. For multiple prior
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agents, e.g., different priors are usually relevant for buyers and sellers of a
contingent claim3. A reallocation of goods over states is then uncontested if
its value is independent4 of the specific priors in P.
The preceding reasoning suggests the following concept of constrained
efficiency.
Definition 4 Let E =
(
I, (ei, U i)i∈I ,E
)
be a Knightian economy. Let c =
(ci)i∈I be a feasible allocation. Let ψ be a state–price density. We call the
allocation c uncertainty neutral efficient (given ψ and E) if there is no other
feasible allocation d = (di)i=1,...,I with
ηi = ψ
(
di − ei
)
∈ LE
and U i(di) > U i(ci) for all i ∈ I.
Knight–Walras equilibria satisfy our robust version of efficiency.
Theorem 4 Let (ψ, c) be a Knight–Walras equilibrium of the Knightian
economy E =
(
I, (ei, U i)i∈I ,E
)
. Then c is uncertainty neutral efficient (given
ψ and E).
Proof: Let (ψ, c) be a Knight–Walras equilibrium of the Knightian
economy E =
(
I, (ei, U i)i∈I ,P
)
. Suppose there is a feasible allocation
d = (di)i=1,...,I with U
i(di) > U i(ci) for all i ∈ I. From optimality, we have
3For general variational preferences, one can still derive the relevant beliefs for
a given contingent consumption plan, compare, e.g., Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki
(2008). This welfare theorem can be compared with the welfare criterion of
Blume, Cogley, Easley, Sargent, and Tsyrennikov (2015) for evaluation of different finan-
cial market designs, which has a similar motivation as for our notion of Knight–Walras
equilibria. On the one hand, we aim to prevent welfare-reducing speculation through the
disambiguation of net trades. On the other hand, the price we have to pay, as a designer,
is the exclusion of welfare-improving insurance possibilities through the conditions on the
value of net trades.
4Recently, new notions of Pareto optimality under uncertainty appeared in the lit-
erature. Gilboa, Samuelson, and Schmeidler (2014), Brunnermeier, Simsek, and Xiong
(2014), and Blume, Cogley, Easley, Sargent, and Tsyrennikov (2015) make the point that
the standard notion of Pareto optimality can be spurious when agents hold subjective
heterogeneous beliefs. Earlier, Dreze (1972) already emphasized that importing the con-
cept of Pareto dominance under certainty to the Arrow–Debreu world under uncertainty
may result in odd implications. Since our setup allows for heterogeneous expectations, see
Example 1, their arguments carry over, in principle, to our setup.
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then di /∈ B(ψ, ei), or Eηi > 0. Suppose furthermore ηi = ψ (di − ei) ∈ LE.
Take any prior P ∈ P. As the net excess demand is ambiguity–free in mean,
we have
EPηi = Eηi > 0 .
As the expectation under P is linear, we obtain by summing up and feasibility
of the allocation d
0 = EP
I∑
i=1
ψ(di − ei) =
I∑
i=1
EPψ(di − ei) > 0 ,
a contradiction. ✷
6 Sensitivity of Arrow–Debreu Equilibria
with respect to Knightian Uncertainty
In this section we explore first the robustness of Arrow–Debreu equilibria with
respect to the introduction of a small amount of Knightian uncertainty when
agents have multiple prior utilities. With no aggregate uncertainty, equilibria
change in a discontinuous way with small uncertainty perturbations; whereas
agents attain full insurance under pure risk, no trade (and thus no insurance)
occurs in equilibrium with a tiny amount of Knightian uncertainty. We then
take the opposite view and consider growing uncertainty. When uncertainty
is sufficiently large, no trade is again the unique equilibrium.
Throughout this section, we fix continuously differentiable, strictly con-
cave, and strictly increasing Bernoulli utility functions ui : R+ → R and
write for a given set of priors P
U iP(c) = min
P∈P
EPui(c)
for the associated multiple prior utility function.5
Let us start with an example where the introduction of a tiny amount of
uncertainty changes the equilibrium allocation drastically.
5Insurance properties of sharing rules are considered for several classes of preferences.
De Castro and Chateauneuf (2011) discuss the case for Choquet expected utility. A more
general perspective can be found in Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008).
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Example 3 Let Ω = {1, 2}. Let the set of priors be Pǫ = {p ∈ ∆ : p1 ∈
[1
2
− ǫ, 1
2
+ ǫ]} for some ǫ ∈ [0, 1/2).
For ǫ > 0, a consumption plan is ambiguity–free in mean if and only if it
is full insurance; we have LP = {c ∈ X : c1 = c2}.
Let there be no aggregate ambiguity, without loss of generality e = 1 in
both states. Let there be two agents I = 2 (with multiple prior utilities as
stated above) and uncertain endowments, e.g. e1 = (1/3, 2/3) and e2 =
(2/3, 1/3).
In a Knight–Walras equilibrium, the state price has to be strictly positive
because of strictly monotone utility functions. Since we have two agents, the
budget constraint implies that
0 = Eψ(c1 − e1) = Eψ(c2 − e2)
or
0 = Eψ(c1 − e1) = E(−ψ(c1 − e1)) .
Hence, ψ(c1− e1) is mean–ambiguity free, thus constantly equal to zero here.
Since ψ is strictly positive, c1 = e1 follows. There is no trade in Knight–
Walras equilibrium for every ǫ > 0. In sharp contrast, agents achieve full
insurance in every Arrow–Debreu equilibrium of any linear economy E{P}.
The example uses the fact that we are in a simple world with two states
and two agents. In general, the situation will be more involved. Nevertheless,
the discontinuity when passing from a risk economy to E{P} to a Knightian
economy EE remains.
Let us now consider economies of the form
EE =
(
I,
(
ei, U iP
)
i=1...,I
,EP
)
with strictly positive initial endowment allocation e = (e1, . . . , eI) ∈ XI++.
Here, EP denotes the Knightian expectation induced by the set of priors P.
We assume that aggregate endowment is constant, e¯ =
∑
i∈I e
i ∈ R++.
Let K(∆) be the set of closed and convex subsets of int(∆) equipped
with the usual Haussdorff metric dH . Define the Knight–Walras equilibrium
correspondence KW : K(∆)× XI+ ⇒ X
I+1
+ via
KW(P) =
{
(ψ, c) ∈ XI+1+ : (c, ψ) is a KW–equilibrium in E
P
}
.
According to Theorem 1, the set of KW–equilibria KW(P) in the economy
is nonempty.
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Theorem 6.1 Let P : [0, 1) → K(∆) be a continuous correspondence with
P(0) = {P0} for some P0 ∈ int(∆). For 0 < ǫ < 1, assume P0 ∈ intP(ǫ).
For 0 ≤ ǫ < 1, define the Knightian expectation EǫX = E
P(ǫ)X =
maxP∈P(ǫ)E
PX.
The Knight–Walras equilibrium correspondence
ǫ 7→ KW(P(ǫ), e)
is discontinuous in zero.
Proof: For ǫ = 0, we are in an Arrow–Debreu economy without aggregate
uncertainty. As a consequence, KW(P(0), e) contains only full insurance
allocations.
Fix ǫ > 0. Let us first show that a mapping X : Ω → R is P(ǫ)–
ambiguity–free in mean if and only if it is constant. Due to our assumptions,
P(ǫ) contains a ball around P0 of the form
Bη(P0) = {Q ∈ ∆ : ‖Q− P0‖ < η}
for some η > 0. We use here, without loss of generality, the maximum norm
in RΩ.
Suppose EQX = c for some c ∈ R and all Q ∈ P(ǫ). Let 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈
X denote the vector with all components equal to 1. Let Z ∈ X satisfy
Z · 1 = 0 with ‖Z‖ = 1. Then P0 + η˜Z ∈ Bη(P0) ⊂ P(ǫ) for all 0 < η˜ < η.
Hence, we have
c = EP0+ηZX = EP0X + η˜Z ·X .
As 0 < η˜ < η is arbitrary, Z · X = 0 for all Z with norm 1 and Z · 1 = 0
follows. By linearity, this extends to all Z with Z · 1 = 0; it follows that X
is a multiple of 1, hence constant.
In the next step, we show that (ψ, c) ∈ KW(P(ǫ)) implies c = e. Let (ψ, c)
be a Knight–Walras equilibrium for the economy EP(ǫ). Let ξi = ψ(ci − ei)
be the value of net trade for agent i. Then
∑
ξi = 0 by market clearing. As
the utility functions are strictly monotone, the budget constraint is binding,
so Eǫξ
i = 0 for all i. From subadditivity, we get Eǫ(−ξ
i) ≥ 0. On the other
hand, from market clearing, subadditivity, and the binding budget constraint,
Eǫ[−ξ
i] = Eǫ
∑
j 6=i
ξj ≤
∑
j 6=i
Eǫξ
j = 0 .
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We conclude that ξi is ambiguity–free in mean, thus constant. Due to the
budget constraint, ξi = 0. As state prices must be strictly positive in equi-
librium due to strictly monotone utility functions, we conclude that ci = ei.
The Knight–Walras equilibrium correspondence is thus discontinuous in
zero. ✷
The previous result shows that a tiny amount of Knightian uncertainty
can substantially change equilibria. We now consider the opposite case of
growing Knightian uncertainty and impose no assumption on the aggregate
endowment e¯ =
∑
ei. We show that no trade is the only equilibrium if
Knightian uncertainty is large enough, thus generalizing our initial example
2.
Next we state a simple result on uniqueness of Knight–Walras equilibria,
when no–trade is an equilibrium.
Lemma 2 If (ψ, e) is a Knight–Walras equilibrium, then e is the unique
Knight–Walras equilibrium allocation.
Proof: Suppose there is another Knight–Walras equilibrium allocation
(ψ′, x) with ∅ 6= J = {i ∈ I : xi 6= ei}. We have U j(xj) ≥ U j(ej) for all j ∈ J.
We show E[ψ′(xj − ej)] > 0 for all j ∈ J, which contradicts the budget
feasibility of xj . Take some ǫ > 0 and note that U j(xj + ǫej) > U j(xj) by
strict monotonicity. As xj is optimal in the budget set, we obtain E[ψ′(xj +
ǫej − ej)] > 0. Letting ǫ to zero, we have E[ψ′(xj − ej)] ≥ 0. Now suppose
E[ψ′(xk − ek)] = 0 for some k ∈ J. Since Uk is strictly concave, we derive for
any α ∈ (0, 1)
Uk(αxk + (1− α)ek) > αUk(xk) + (1− α)Uk(ek) ≥ Uk(ek).
We now obtain
0 < E
[
ψ′
(
αxk + (1− α)ei − ek
)]
= E
[
ψ′α(xk − ek)
]
= αE
[
ψ′(xk − ek)
]
≤ 0 ,
a contradiction. ✷
Next we increase the Knightian uncertainty in the economy EP. As the
following result shows, if ambiguity becomes sufficiently large then there is
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no trade in equilibrium. Recall that we keep the standing assumption on
multiple prior utility functions.
Theorem 5 If ambiguity is large, every Knight–Walras–equilibrium is a no–
trade equilibrium: There is a P′ ∈ K(∆) such that for every P′′ ∈ K(∆) with
P′′ ⊃ P′ we have
KW(P′′) = Xψ,P ′′ × {e}
for Xψ,P ′′ =
{
ψ ∈ X++ : u
i′(ei) · argmaxP∈PE
P [ui(ei)] ∩ ψ · P′′ ∀i ∈ I
}
.
Proof: Since utility is strictly increasing, an equilibrium state price must
be strictly positive.
Under full Knightian uncertainty, P = ∆, the budget set is [0, ei]. By
strict monotonicity and convexity of preferences, the better–off set {x ∈
X+ : U
i
P
(x) ≥ U i
P
(ei)} can be supported by a hyperplane with a strictly
positive normal vector πi. Since U i
P
is of multiple prior type, an increase of
P to P′ ∈ K(∆) let the better–off set {x ∈ X+ : U
i
P′
(x) ≥ U i
P′
(ei)} shrink and
P π
i
= π
i
‖πi‖
remains a supporting prior.
For large P′ such that P π
i
∈ P′ for all i ∈ I, all individual first order
conditions are satisfied. ei is then optimal in BP
′
(1, ei). A larger P′′ ⊃ P′ leave
this result unchanged. An application of Lemma 2 establishes uniqueness of
the no–trade equilibrium. ✷
7 Conclusion
Knightian uncertainty leads naturally to nonlinear expectations derived from
a set of priors. This led us to study a new equilibrium concept, Knight–
Walras equilibrium, where prices are sublinear. We established existence of
such equilibrium points and studied its efficiency properties. While one can-
not expect fully efficient allocations, in general, Knight–Walras equilibrium
allocations satisfy a restricted efficiency ctriterion: when the social planner is
restricted to ambiguity–neutral trades, she cannot improve upon a Knight–
Walras equilibrium allocation.
The introduction of Knightian friction on the price side rather than the
utility side can have strong effects. In a world without aggregate uncertainty,
no trade equilibria result even with a tiny amount of uncertainty. The abrupt
change of equilibria with respect to Knightian uncertainty has potentially
17
strong implications for consumption–based asset pricing results which rely
on the assumption of probabilistically sophisticated agents and markets. In
dynamic and continuous–time models, these questions remain to be explored.
A Existence
We begin with an investigation of the Knight-Walras correspondence B in
(3). To prove the continuity of our budget correspondence, we follow the
lines of Debreu (1982). Set [0, x] = {y ∈ X : 0 ≤ y ≤ x} ⊂ X. e¯ =
∑
i e
i
denotes the aggregate endowment and ∆ = ∆X is the simplex in X.
Lemma 3 1. The budget sets B(ψ, ei) in (3) with ψ ≥ 0 are nonempty,
closed, and convex. If ψ and ei are strictly positive, B(ψ, ei) is also
compact.
2. The Knight-Walras budget correspondence B(·, ei) is homogeneous of
degree zero.
3. Let the consumption set be [0, 2e¯] and fix any ei ∈ X++. Then the
correspondence ψ 7→ B¯(ψ, ei) = B(ψ, ei) ∩ [0, 2e¯] is continuous at any
ψ ∈ ∆.
Proof of Lemma 3:
1. Since 0, ei ∈ B(ψ, ei), for every ψ, ei ∈ X+, B is nonempty. The budget
set B(ψ, ei) is the intersection of budget sets under linear prices of the
form EP [ψ·], that is,
B(ψ, ei) =
⋂
P∈P
B
P (ψ, ei),
where BP (ψ, ei) =
{
c ∈ X+ : E
P [ψ(c− ei)] ≤ 0
}
denotes the closed and
convex budget in an Arrow–Debreu economy under P = {P}. The
arbitrary intersection of convex (closed) sets is again convex (closed)
and so is B(ψ, ei).
Standard arguments with linear price systems yield compactness of
BP (ψ, ei) whenever ei(ω), ψ(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. Since the arbitrary
intersection of compact sets is again compact, the result then follows.
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2. By definition, the nonlinear expectation is positive homogeneous. The
result then follows by the same arguments as in the case with linear
price systems.
3. [0, 2e¯] is a compact, convex, nonempty consumption set in X = RΩ. We
prove the continuity of B¯ : ∆⇒ [0, 2e¯].
To establish upper hemi-continuity, it suffices to show the closed graph
property, since B¯(ψ, ei) is compact valued. The graph of the budget
correspondence gr(B¯) = {(ψ, x) ∈ ∆ × [0, 2e¯] : x ∈ B¯(ψ, x)} is closed
since ψ 7→ maxP∈PE
Pψx is continuous for all x ∈ X, by an application
of Berge’s maximum theorem.
We show lower hemi-continuity, i.e., if (ψn, xn)→ (ψ, x) in X× X and
x ∈ B¯(ψ, ei) then there is a sequence xn ∈ [0, 2e¯] converging to x and
xn ∈ B¯(ψn, e
i), for every n ∈ N.
Let us denote by Ψn the price system induced by ψn ∈ ∆. We consider
two cases.
case 1: If Ψ(x− ei) < 0, then for a large n¯ we still have Ψn¯(x− e
i) < 0.
We may take the following converging sequence
xn =
{
x′ ∈ B¯(ψn, e
i) arbitrary, if n ≤ n¯
x, n > n¯
case 2: If Ψ(x − ei) = 0, there is a x′ ∈ [0, 2e¯] such that Ψ(x′ − ei) <
0. Since ei > 0 by assumption, take x′ = e
i
2
and since E is positive
homogeneous, strictly monotone and constant preserving, we get
Ψ(x′ − ei) =
1
2
Ψ(−ei) =
1
2
E− ψei < E0 = 0.
For n large, the intersection of {y ∈ X : Ψn(y − e
i) = 0} and {y ∈ X :
∃λ ∈ R : y = λx + (1 − λ)x′} is nonempty and denoted by Ψ∩n . Since
Ψ∩n is the closed subset of a line, x¯n = argminy∈Ψ∩n ‖y − x‖ is unique.
Now, set
xn =
{
x¯n, if x¯n ∈ [x
′, x]
x, else
By construction, we have xn ∈ B(ψn, e
i) and xn → x in X.
✷
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Let us introduce the Knight–Walras demand correspondence
X i(ψ, ei) := argmax
x∈B(ψ,ei)
U i(x)
and the aggregate excess demand
z(ψ) =
∑
i∈I
X i(ψ, ei)− ei =
{
z =
∑
i∈I
xi − ei : xi ∈ X i(ψ, ei), i ∈ I
}
. (4)
We collect, under our standing Assumption 1, the following standard proper-
ties for the aggregate demand correspondence which we employ in the proof
of Theorem 1.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds for every agent in the economy
and let Ψ(·) = E[ψ·] be a sublinear price system on X. The correspondence
z : X+ ⇒ X in (4)
1. is upper hemi-continuous and nonempty compact convex valued.
2. is homogeneous of degree zero.
3. satisfies the weak Walras law: Ψ(z) ≤ 0, for every z ∈ z(ψ).
Proof of Proposition 1:
1. The budget correspondence is convex valued and continuous, by Lemma
3. Applying Berge’s Maximum theorem to each X i(·) gives that z(·)
is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence as well. The concavity of
U i gives us that z(·) is convex valued.
2. By Lemma 3, B is homogeneous of degree zero in ψ. This implies that
each X i is also homogeneous of degree zero, and so is z(·).
3. By the budget constraint we have Ψ (xi − ei) ≤ 0, for every xi ∈
X i(ei,Ψ) and i ∈ I. The sub-additivity of Ψ then implies
Ψ(z) = Ψ
(∑
i∈I
xi − ei
)
≤
∑
i∈I
Ψ
(
xi − ei
)
≤ 0.
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✷Proof of Theorem 1: By the definition of E, every price system E[ψ·] :
X→ R can be written as
EψX = max
P∈P
EPψX, X ∈ X.
The budget set B(ψ, ei) is in general not compact within X, so we truncate
B via B(ψ, ei) = B(ψ, ei) ∩ [0, 2e¯] and denote the corresponding truncated
economy by E = {[0, 2e¯], U¯ i, ei}. U¯ i : [0, 2e¯] → R is the restriction of U i to
[0, 2e¯]. We show first existence of an equilibrium in E and then check in step
6 and 7 that this I + 1 tuple is also an equilibrium in E .
The existence proof of an equilibrium in E is divided into five steps.
1. Continuity of the Budget correspondence: By Assumption 1, each
initial endowment ei is strictly positive. The continuity of the corre-
spondence B : ∆⇒ [0, 2e¯] follows from Lemma 3.3.
2. Demand correspondence: Consider the (truncated) demand corre-
spondence X
i
: ∆ ⇒ [0, 2e¯]. By step 1, B(·, ei) : ∆ ⇒ [0, 2e¯] is contin-
uous, hence by Berge’s maximum theorem the demand
X
i
(ψ) = arg max
x∈B(ψ,ei)
U¯ i (x)
is upper hemi-continuous, compact and non empty valued, since U
i
is
continuous on gr(B). By the concavity of U i, X
i
(ψ) is convex-valued.
3. Walrasian Player: Define the Walrasian price adjustment correspon-
dence W : [0, 2e¯]I × P⇒ ∆ via
W (x1, . . . , xI , P ) = argmax
ψ∈∆
EP
[
ψ
∑
i∈I
(
xi − ei
)]
.
Again, by Berge’s Maximum Theorem, the correspondence is upper
hemi-continuous and attains convex, compact and nonempty values, by
the continuity of the linear expectation in (x1, . . . , xI) and the linearity
in ψ.
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4. Knightian Price Players: Define the Knightian adjustment correspon-
dence K : [0, 2e¯]I ×∆⇒ P via
K
(
x1, . . . , xI , ψ
)
= argmax
P∈P
EP
[
ψ
∑
i∈I
(
xi − ei
)]
.
Once gain, by Berge’s Maximum Theorem, the correspondence is upper
hemi-continuous and attains convex, compact and nonempty values.
5. Existence of a Fixed-Point: Set X =
(
X
1
, . . . , X
I
)
. Putting things
together we have the combined correspondence[
KXW
]
: P× [0, 2e¯]I ×∆⇒ P× [0, 2e¯]I ×∆
as a product of nonempty and compact–convex valued upper hemi-
continuous correspondences (see step 2, 3 and 4). Consequently, a
fixed–point (
P¯ , x¯1, . . . x¯i, ψ¯
)
∈
[
KXW
] (
P¯ , x¯1, . . . x¯i, ψ¯
)
exists by an application of Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem.
6. Feasibility: We check the feasibility of the fixed-point allocation x¯.
By the budget constraint and the sublinearity of X 7→ Eψ¯X (since
ψ¯ ≥ 0), we derive by the definitions of ψ¯, via the Walrasian price
player correspondence W , and P¯ , via the Knightian price player corre-
spondence K,
0 ≥
∑
i
E
[
ψ¯(x¯i − ei)
]
≥ EP
[
ψ¯
∑
i
(x¯i − ei)
]
= EP¯
[
ψ¯
∑
i
(x¯i − ei)
]
≥ EP¯
[
ψ
∑
i
(x¯i − ei)
]
(5)
The first inequality follows from the definition of the budget set and
x¯i ∈ X¯ i(ψ) for all i ∈ I. The last inequality holds for all ψ ∈ ∆ and
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by the positive homogeneity of linear expectations, it holds even for all
ψ ∈ X+. Since ∈¯ int(∆). We have l
(∑
i∈I x¯
i − ei)
)
≤ 0 for all positive
linear form on X. This implies
∑
i∈I(x¯
i − ei) ≤ 0.
For the feasibility of the equilibrium allocation, the truncation is irrel-
evant.
7. Maximality in EP: Since x¯i ∈ X
i
(ψ¯), we have
x¯i ∈ arg max
x∈B(ψ,ei)∩[0,2e¯]
U¯ i(x).
We have to show that x¯i also maximizes U i on B(ψ, ei). Suppose there is
a x ∈ B(ψ, ei) in the original budget set, such that U i(x) > U i(x¯i). But
then we have for some small λ ∈ (0, 1), λx+(1−λ)xi ∈ B(ψ, ei)∩[0, 2e¯].
The concavity of each U i gives us
U i(λx+ (1− λ)xi) ≥ λU i(x) + (1− λ)U i(xi) > U i(xi),
a contradiction. Therefore, (x¯1, . . . , x¯I , ψ¯) is also an equilibrium in the
original economy EP.
✷
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